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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Fisher v. University of Texas (Fisher II) 1
marks the first time Justice Anthony Kennedy has ruled in favor of a racial
 Professor of Law, James P. Bradley Chair in Constitutional Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles;
B.A., Duke University; J.D., Yale Law School. I wish to thank Jonathan Glater and the participants in
the University of California, Irvine School of Law Symposium on Higher Education Access for their insights,
comments, and support of this project. I would also like to express my deep appreciation to my research
assistants Michaela Goldstein, Jadai Hamilton, Mary Polk, and Neil Richmond. Very special thanks to
the editors of the UC Irvine Law Review for their excellent editorial assistance.
1. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II ) , 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016), aff’g 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013).

133

First to Printer_West-Faulcon (Do Not Delete)

134

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

9/19/2017 9:06 AM

[ Vol. 7:133

affirmative action policy in the twenty-eight years he has served on the Court.2 The
Fisher II decision should be understood as both the affirmative action case that
supporters of affirmative action could not afford to lose and the case that shows
just how much its opponents have already won. The case epitomizes the reversed
state of the Court’s current equal protection jurisprudence after multiple decades of
sustained attacks on racial affirmative action.3 It also exemplifies the Court’s
willingness to afford reverse race discrimination claimants the greatest protection
possible—by applying the most stringent level of judicial review—and traditional
race discrimination claimants virtually none.4 Although the Supreme Court
ultimately found no equal protection violation,5 its solicitous approach to
evaluating Abigail Fisher’s reverse discrimination claim demonstrates how
reversed equal protection jurisprudence has become. Reverse discrimination
plaintiffs like Fisher receive doctrinal super-empathy from the Court while
traditional race discrimination claims are treated with doctrinal super-apathy even if
the policy in question substantially favors whites.6

2. Ariane de Vogue, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Evolution on Affirmative Action, CNN POLITICS
( June 23, 2016, 2:21 PM) http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/23/politics/supreme-court-anthonykennedy-affirmative-action/ [https://perma.cc/H7EN-PPFV]. It is indeed notable that Fisher II
was the first time that Justice Kennedy found a race-conscious remedy to be within
the bounds of the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I ) , 133
S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
3. Here, I am referring to the Court’s failure to treat statistically significant and racially
disparate impact against nonwhites as racial classifications triggering heightened scrutiny absent proof
of discriminatory intent under the doctrine set forth in cases like Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), and McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987), at the same time has demonstrated a willingness to treat any race-conscious policy, whether or
not it constitutes an effective racial affirmative action policy, as a racial classification. See, e.g., Fisher II,
136 S. Ct. 2198; Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411; J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469; Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
4. I am of the view that what makes an equal protection claim a “reverse discrimination” as
opposed to a traditional discrimination claim is the fact that the plaintiff is challenging
the constitutionality of an affirmative action policy or other policy designed to promote racial
inclusiveness of historically excluded racial groups.
5. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215.
6. In this article, I have compiled and analyzed the overall numerical admissions outcomes and
admission rates for the Texas Ten Percent Plan and holistic review 2008 UT applicants by racial
group—data that was not compiled nor presented by the parties in the Fisher case and, thus, not
considered by the courts that ruled on the merits of the Fisher lawsuit. See Kimberly West-Faulcon,
Forsaking Claims of Merit: The Advance of Race-Blindness Entitlement in Fisher v. Texas, in 29 CIVIL
RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 335, 353 (Steven Saltzman ed.,
2013). The admission rate for white applicants was 22.3% whereas the admission rates for African
American and Latino applicants were a much lower 8.8% and 10.4%, respectively. See infra Figure 2 and
accompanying text.
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The fact that the University of Texas at Austin (UT)’s7 race-conscious
“holistic review”8 policy had a statistically and legally significant racially
discriminatory effect on African American and Latino applicants failed to be raised
during any stage of the Fisher I and Fisher II litigation. This Article fills that gap
with analysis of UT selection rates by race that shows how wildly inappropriate it
was for Abigail Fisher to challenge UT’s minimal consideration of race as reverse
discrimination. It also explains that, even though Justice Kennedy correctly
recognized that the manner in which UT considered race satisfied strict scrutiny,9
Fisher II is nevertheless emblematic of reversed protection.10
The key justification for applying strict scrutiny to racial affirmative action
policies—to protect members of non-beneficiary racial groups from
unfairness—is totally inapt to the facts in the Fisher case. This Article’s analysis of
UT selection rates by race shows that white (and Asian American11) applicants were
selected at a significantly higher rate than African American and Latino

7. The Court accepted UT’s categorization of its use of race as but “a factor of a factor of a
factor” in UT’s holistic review. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207 (citation omitted). Moreover, race could be
considered positively for applicants of any race and the limited consideration of race was not a
mandatory factor for any individual applicant:
[A]lthough admissions officers can consider race as a positive feature of a minority student’s
application, there is no dispute the race is but a “factor of a factor of a factor” in the holisticreview calculus. 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 608 (W.D. Tex. 2009). Furthermore, consideration of
race is contextual and does not operate as a mechanical plus factor for underrepresented
minorities. Id. at 606 (“Plaintiffs cite no evidence to show racial groups other than AfricanAmericans and Hispanics are excluded from benefitting from UT’s consideration of race in
admissions.”).
Id.
8. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205.
9. See id. at 19. This conclusion was unexpected based on Kennedy’s Fisher I opinion. In Fisher
I, Kennedy essentially admonished the lower court for not applying strict scrutiny strictly enough. See
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. Given how regularly critics mischaracterize restrained racial affirmative
action policies as conferring large-scale racial preferences, Fisher II’s accuracy in its factual analysis of
UT’s policy is noteworthy and significant. An exaggerated and apocryphal version of UT’s raceconscious holistic review was presented by various Fisher amici present in their
briefs and public commentary. See, e.g., Gail Heriot, A “Dubious Expediency”: How RacePreferential Admissions Policies on Campus Hurt Minority Students, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
(Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/08/a-dubious-expediency-howrace-preferential-admissions-policies-on-campus-hurt-minority-students [https://perma.cc/5ZY5VHAW] (describing the facts in the 1978 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke case); Brief for Richard
Sander & Stuart Taylor as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411; Brief for
Richard Sander & Stuart Taylor as Amici Curiae in Supporting of Neither Party, Fisher, 758 F.3d 633
(5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3682 (U.S. June 29, 2015) (No. 14-981).
10. Russell Robinson has described the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence as “unequal
protection.” See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 154 (2016) (noting that
“[d]uring the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has steadily diminished the vigor of the Equal
Protection Clause in most respects. It has turned away people of color . . . because their oppression
does not take the form of a ‘racial classification’”) (citing McClesky, 481 U.S. 279). My point here
is similar. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1471 (2004).
11. See Kimberly West-Faulcon, Obscuring Asian Penalty with Illusions of Black Bonus, 64
UCLA L. REV. DISC. 590 (2017).
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students the year Abigail Fisher applied for admission12—a factual scenario
consistent with a legally cognizable degree of adverse impact against African
Americans and Latinos under Title VI disparate impact law.13
Part I of the Article sets forth admissions data by race, my calculations of
selection rates, and racial disparate impact analysis for UT’s Fall 2008 admissions
cycle,14 showing that the disparity between the white selection rate and the African
American and Latino selection rates was more than large enough to prove a prima
facie case of discrimination under Title VI disparate impact law.15 Part II presents
significant but neglected factual details about UT’s race-conscious holistic review
process, such as the major role that SAT scores played in that component of
admissions. It also critiques Justice Kennedy’s use of strict scrutiny in reviewing
UT’s admissions policy as the application of doctrinal rules that have improperly
reversed the protection conferred by the Equal Protection Clause.16 In conclusion,
I suggest the lesson from Fisher II is that the Court should impose a discriminatory
effect requirement on claims of reverse discrimination that mirrors the effect
requirement17 the Court already imposes on traditional discrimination plaintiffs.18
12. This point is different from the observation that UT’s consideration of race did not
negatively affect the admission chances of Abigail Fisher, individually. UT admitted members of
historically poorly represented racial groups at lower rates than the two racial groups already wellrepresented among students applying, admitted, and enrolled at UT. To be considered effective, a racial
affirmative action policy should have some positive discernable impact on the selection rates of
members of racial groups in the numerical minority of applying, admitted, and enrolled students as
compared to selection rates of members of racial groups who comprise the vast majority of the students
applying, selected, and enrolling. A university’s affirmative action policy has failed to operate effectively
if, like UT’s policy, it fails to significantly increase racial group inclusion—if members of historically
poorly represented racial groups are admitted at significantly lower rates than whites.
13. Section 601 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, provides that “[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). U.S. Department of Education regulations promulgated to
enforce Title VI set forth the “specific discriminatory actions” that recipients of federal funds must
avoid. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (2008).
14. This admissions rate and disparate impact analysis was not presented by either party in the
Fisher I case, and the Court’s analysis in Fisher II erroneously relied on enrollment data rather than
admissions data to evaluate holistic review outcomes. I filed an amicus curiae brief providing this
analysis to the Court. See generally Brief of Kimberly West-Faulcon as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 [hereinafter West-Faulcon, Fisher I Amicus Brief ].
15. See infra text accompanying note 63 (explaining requirements for proving a Title VI
disparate impact prima facie case of discrimination).
16. By “racially inclusive purpose,” I mean a policy that considers race for the purpose of
including members of historically oppressed racial groups in the numerical minority of applying,
selected, and enrolled students. The corollary would be the adoption of a facially race-conscious policy
for a racially exclusionary purpose—to perpetuate animus toward or negative racial stereotypes about
a racial group or solely to bring harm to members of a particular racial group.
17. For the discriminatory purpose requirement, see Davis, 426 U.S. 288. For the
discriminatory effect requirement, see Davis as well as Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). See also
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
18. The Court’s willingness to treat any and all race consciousness as capable of resulting in
reverse discrimination against whites is a framing that has undoubtedly contributed to the current
political climate in which many whites sincerely believe whites suffer greater levels of racial
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I. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE THAT UT’S RACE-CONSCIOUS HOLISTIC REVIEW
DISCRIMINATED AGAINST AFRICAN AMERICANS AND LATINOS
The Fall 2008 UT admissions policy challenged by petitioner Abigail Fisher
had two components, one that Fisher challenged as violating the Equal Protection
Clause and another that she argued constituted a race-neutral19 alternative to the
first.20 The latter component of UT admissions was an example of admissions
policies that have come to be known as “percentage plans.”21 These admissions
policies guarantee college admission to a particular university or university system
based on either a high school student’s grade point average (GPA)-based class
ranking of all students attending a particular high school or a student’s placement
within a designated percentage of a GPA-ranking of all high school students in his
or her state—high school class rank or statewide GPA rank.22
The Texas state legislature adopted the high school class rank type of
percentage plan when in adopted the Texas Ten Percent Law.23 The state legislature
discrimination than nonwhites. See, e.g., Samuel Sommers & Michael Norton, White People Think
Racism is Getting Worse. Against White People, THE WASH. POST ( July 21, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/07/21/white-people-think-racism-is-gettingworse-against-white-people/ [https://perma.cc/Q6RB-AK5S]; John Blake, Are Whites
Racially Oppressed?, CNN (Mar. 4, 2011, 9:01 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/12/21/
white.persecution/index.html [https://perma.cc/C3NZ-SKGH].
19. Petitioner Fisher characterized UT’s Ten Percent Plan as not considering race despite the
fact that the Texas state legislature was acutely aware that requiring UT to admit based on high school
class rank would increase African American and Latino admissions due to the high levels of racial
segregation in Texas public high schools. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and
Other Relief at 11, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 1:08-cv-00263-SS) [hereinafter Second Amended
Complaint] (“Neither race nor ethnic origin was considered in admissions to UT’s incoming freshman
class under the Top 10-AI/PAI Plan used for admissions from 1998 through 2004.”).
20. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205.
21. In this important sense—the fact that the Texas Ten Percent Law guarantees top ranked
high school students’ admission to the state’s most selective university—the Texas law differs from
other state university admissions “percentage plans.” Significantly, the admissions percentage plans of
states like California and Florida do not guarantee admission to those states’ university systems’ most
selective and prestigious undergraduate universities. Instead, students ranking at the top of their high
school classes in those states are guaranteed admission to one of the campuses in the university system
but not guaranteed admission to their state’s flagship campuses. See CATHERINE L. HORN & STELLA
M. FLORES, PERCENT PLANS IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE
STATES’ EXPERIENCES 19–22 (2003) (describing differences between Texas percentage plan and
California and Florida percentage plans that guarantee only admission to the University of California
system, not admission to its most selective campuses, to the top 4% of each California’s high schools’
graduates and only admission to the Florida State University system, again not to its most selective
campuses, to the top 20% of each Florida high school class). Again, in contrast, Texas top 10% students
are guaranteed admission to UT Austin—the most selective university in the Texas system.
22. Id.
23. Under this law, HB 588 (the “Texas Ten Percent Law”), admission to UT—the flagship
campus in the University of Texas system—is guaranteed to Texas residents graduating with a class
rank in the top 10% or better from a Texas high school and for Texas students ranking in the top 10%
who attended a school outside the United States operated by the U.S. Department of Defense. See H.B.
588, 1997 Leg., 75th Reg. Sess. § 51.803 (Tex. 1997) [hereinafter Texas Ten Percent Law]. The Texas
legislature passed the Ten Percent Law to remedy the effect of the Texas Attorney General’s ruling that
UT was prohibited from considering race as a factor in admissions after the Fifth Circuit ruling in
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enacted the plan in 1997 subsequent to the Texas Attorney General’s interpretation
of a Fifth Circuit decision as requiring UT to eliminate any race-conscious
components of its admissions process.24 Several years later, in 2003, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed in Grutter v. Bollinger that universities may legally consider race as
a non-determinative factor in selective higher education admissions. After the
Grutter ruling, UT reinstated a minimal degree of race consciousness to the thenrace-blind holistic review component of its admissions process. It is that aspect of
UT admissions that the Court upheld as constitutional in Fisher II.
Reverse discrimination petitioner Abigail Fisher was ineligible for admission
to UT under the high school class rank percentage plan—Texas Ten Percent
Plan25—because she ranked 81 out of 680 students at her high school.26 Fisher’s
high school GPA ranking placed her in the top 12% of her graduating class, but not
the top 10%. So, as the Court observed in Fisher II, Fisher had no chance of
admission under UT’s race-blind top 10% admissions policy. Because the Ten
Percent Plan made Fisher “categorically ineligible for more than three-fourths of
the slots in the incoming freshman class,”27 she “would have had a better chance of
being admitted to the University [of Texas] if the school used race-conscious holistic
review to select its entire incoming class.”28 Nevertheless, Fisher claimed that UT’s
race-conscious holistic review discriminated against her because she was white. The
fact that UT’s race-conscious holistic review resulted in a significant white
admissions advantage, not disadvantage, went unmentioned by the parties and the
Court’s decision in Fisher II.

Hopwood v. Texas. In her dissenting opinion in Fisher I, Justice Ginsburg offered a pointed and valid
critique of the characterization of the Texas Ten Percent Law as “race neutral.” As Justice Ginsburg
and scholars like Michelle Adams have observed that it may be incorrect to view the law as race neutral
given that the racially inclusive effect of the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan is the result of exceedingly
high degrees of racial segregation in Texas public high schools. See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting); Michelle Adams, Isn’t it Ironic? The Central Paradox at the Heart of “Percentage Plans,”
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1767 (2001) (explaining that percentage plans function effectively to diversify
higher education only if secondary education remains firmly racially segregated).
24. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); Effect of Hopwood v. Texas
on Various Scholarship Programs of the University of Houston, 97 Op. Att’y Gen. 001 (1997),
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/48morales/lo/1997/pdf/lo1997001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4PEZ-UWAB].
25. See Texas Ten Percent Law, supra note 23 and accompanying text; Adams, supra note 23;
HORN & FLORES, supra note 21, at 19–22.
26. Fisher’s complaint alleges she ranked 82 out of 674 students who attended her high school.
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 3. UT’s answer states she was ranked 81 out of 680
students in her class. Answer of Defendants to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint at 3, Fisher
v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 08-cv-00263).
27. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2209.
28. Id. at 8 (observing that “it seems quite plausible” that Abigail Fisher “would have had a
better chance of being admitted to the University if the school used race-conscious holistic review to
select its entire incoming class”).
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A. Racial Outcomes Under UT Percentage Plan and Race-Conscious
Holistic Admissions Compared
Many facts about UT’s Fall 2008 admissions outcomes support the conclusion
that the race-consciousness component of holistic review was not the cause of
Fisher’s rejection. First, no African American or Latino applicant with lower
admissions scores than Fisher was selected for Fall 2008 admission.29 Second, fortytwo white applicants with scores “identical to or lower than” Fisher were admitted.30
The fact that higher-scoring nonwhites were rejected along with Fisher belies the
notion that race was the determinative factor in her rejection. Likewise, the fact that
other white applicants—some white applicants with identical scores and others with
lower scores than Fisher—were admitted, strongly suggests Fisher was rejected for
the simple reason that admissions officers were more impressed by other white and
nonwhite candidates, not because Fisher was harmed by diversity-motivated race
consciousness. Third, 168 African American and Latino students with credentials
“identical to or higher than” Abigail Fisher were denied admission,31 showing that
UT’s consideration of race was of such a small degree that significant numbers of
well-qualified African American and Latino applicants were, like Fisher, rejected.
Despite these realities, the complaint filed by Fisher invoked the familiar
reverse discrimination allegation that UT’s use of race operated as a “racial
preference” that had “a pervasive negative effect on non-minority applicants.”32
Fisher also relied on the average-test-score-of-admitted-students fallacy33—the
erroneous conclusion that the existence of differences in the group average SAT
scores of either all admitted African American or all admitted Latino students and
the group average SAT score of all admitted white students proves the university in

29. See Brief for Respondents at 15–16, 16 n.6, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 [hereinafter Brief for
Respondents].
30. See id. at 16 n.6 (UT Austin responding to petitioner Fisher’s assertion that her “academic
credentials exceeded those of many admitted minority applicants” and correcting the district court’s
incorrect statement that sixty-four minority applicants with lower Academic Index (AI) scores than
petitioner were admitted to the Liberal Arts major).
31. Id. at 16 n.6. Only one African American and four Latino students with lower scores than
Fisher were offered admission. Id. at 15–16.
32. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 22. Though Fisher alleged “on information
and belief” in the Second Amended Complaint that “but for” being white she would have been
admitted to UT Austin. See id. at 25. Apparently, the evidence produced in discovery did not support
this contention. Fisher’s lawyers made no such allegations in their briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court and
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, adding to the litany of reasons the Fisher case should have been
dismissed. For other reasons, see Adam D. Chandler, How (Not) To Bring an Affirmative-Action
Challenge, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 85 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/10/01/chandler.html.
However, atypical for “reverse discrimination” plaintiffs, Fisher’s Supreme Court brief touted the fact
that “many” of the accepted African American and Latino who enrolled at UT Austin would have been
admitted “without regard to their race.” Brief for Petitioner at 9, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 [hereinafter
Brief of Petitioner]. Fisher’s brief also noted that “some [minority enrollees] were admitted based solely
on high AI [academic index] scores” and that “[m]any more” would have been admitted under the nonautomatic admissions process without their race being considered at all. Id.
33. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 17. See West-Faulcon, supra note 11, at 601.
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question applied its test score standard in a racially discriminatory manner.34 There
is no factual support for either of these conclusions.35
Figure 1 shows the overall number of applicants by race and for international
students admitted, combining the class rank-based portion of UT admissions and
the race-conscious holistic review admissions component.36
Figure 1. 37

Figure 1 also shows that the total number of white applicants (including top
10% and non-top 10%) to UT Austin was 14,03838 and that, of those white
applicants, 6582 were admitted.39 Of the 2234 African American applicants, 728
were admitted.40 For Latinos, the overall number of applicants was 6081 and, of
those, 2621 Latino students were admitted.41 Of the 4344 Asian Americans who

34. See West-Faulcon, supra note 11.
35. See id. at 601–06.
36. UT Austin’s report on the 2008 UT admissions does not include data on the racial
composition of the international student applicants and admits. See generally THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT
AUSTIN OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS, IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF THE TEXAS AUTOMATIC
ADMISSIONS LAW (HB 588) AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 6, 8 (2008) [hereinafter UT
FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT ].
37. The data presented in Figure 1 is based upon my analysis of publicly available UT Austin
admissions data. See id. at 6, 8; see also West-Faulcon, supra note 6, at 347.
38. See supra Figure 1.
39. See supra Figure 1.
40. See supra Figure 1.
41. See supra Figure 1.

First to Printer_West-Faulcon (Do Not Delete)

2017]

A DISCRIMINATION CLAIM GONE WILD

9/19/2017 9:06 AM

141

applied, an overall 2309 Asian Americans were admitted.42 Figure 1 also shows that
white applicants were admitted in higher numbers overall than any other racial
group—specifically, the admission of 6582 white students exceeded the number of
Latino and Asian American students admitted by 4000 and exceeded the number of
admitted African American students by close to 6000.
Figure 2 below compares the number of students who applied and were
selected under the Ten Percent Plan component of UT admissions and the raceconscious holistic review component. In accordance with the legislatively-imposed
requirements of the Texas Ten Percent Law,43 UT’s race-blind Ten Percent Plan
had the exact same results for all racial groups—all top 10% high school students
were selected. But, whites fared better than nonwhites under the race-conscious
holistic review selection process that Abigail Fisher challenged in the Fisher
litigation.
Figure 2.44

Figure 2 shows that the 4440 white students ranked in the top 10% were
automatically admitted, as were 582 top 10% African American applicants.45 There
were 2218 top 10% Latino applicants admitted along with the 1744 Asian American
42. Of the 2620 international students who applied, 536 international students were admitted.
See supra Figure 1.
43. See Texas Top Ten Percent Law, supra note 23.
44. The data presented in Figure 2 is based upon my analysis of publicly available UT Austin
admissions data. See UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36; West-Faulcon, supra note 11, at
612, Figure 1.
45. See supra Figure 2.
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top 10% automatic admits.46 Under the race-conscious holistic review component
of UT admissions, Figure 2 shows that whites made up the overwhelming majority
of students selected: 2142 of the 9598 white non-top 10% applicants were
admitted.47 But far fewer non-top 10% nonwhites were selected—565 of 2600
Asian Americans; 403 of 3863 Latinos; and only 146 of 1652 African Americans.48
The total number of non-top 10% accepted white students (2142) not only far
outnumbered the total number of accepted African Americans (146), Latinos (403),
and Asian Americans (565), individually, the 2142 total number of non-top 10%
whites admitted was almost twice the number of non-top 10% students from all
other racial groups combined (1114).49
B. Selection Rates for Ten Percent Plan and Race-Conscious Holistic Review by Race
Because top 10% applicants from all racial groups were selected at a rate of
100% based on their high school class rank,50 there was no racial disparity in
selection rates under the Ten Percent Plan component of UT admissions.51
However, Figure 3 shows UT’s race-conscious holistic review process had a much
lower overall selection rate—17.7%52—and, significantly, the holistic review
selection rate varied by race, with white applicants selection at the highest rate of all
other racial groups under the race-conscious policy.53

46. See supra Figure 2. All 234 of the Top 10% international student applicants were also
accepted for admission. See supra Figure 2.
47. See supra Figure 2.
48. See supra Figure 2.
49. See supra Figure 2. The sum of the 146 African-American non-top 10% admits, 403 Latino
non-top 10% admits, and 565 Asian American non-top 10% admits is 1114, which is a little over half
of the 2142 total number of white non-top 10% admits. See supra Figure 2.
50. Over three-fourths of the Fall 2008 UT admission slots were awarded under the Ten
Percent Plan. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2209. Only class rank or high Academic Index (AI) score were
considered for about 83% of all the Fall 2008 UT admits, making the UT admissions process completely
race-blind for 9359 out of 10,200 available spaces. Defendant’s Statement of Facts at 5, Fisher, 645 F.
Supp. 2d at 587 (explaining that the vast majority of Texas residents were admitted without any
consideration of the PAI (Personal Achievement Index) such that “for the class entering fall 2008, only
841 available spaces in the freshman class remained available for Texas residents (out of 10,200)
available spaces) after all automatic admissions based on” either class rank or a high predicted freshmanyear GPA were admitted).
51. See supra Figure 2. All Top 10% applicants of all races were accepted. Therefore, the 10%
admission rate for all races was 100%. See UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36, at 8.
52. See infra Figure 3.
53. Id.
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Figure 3.54

The selection rate for white applicants under UT’s race-conscious, holistic
review was 22.3%.55 That was somewhat higher than the selection rate of 21.7% for
holistic review Asian American applicants.56 The 22.3% white selection rate was
much higher than—over twice as high as—the 10.4% selection rate for Latino
applicants and two-and-a-half times greater than the 8.8% selection rate of African
American applicants.57 Thus, Abigail Fisher’s admissions chances, as a white holistic
review applicant, were over twice as high as they would have been for an African
American or Latino applicant.58
UT’s race-conscious holistic review also favored Abigail Fisher in another
respect beyond the higher white selection rate—Figure 4 below shows Fisher had a
better shot at holistic review admission than nonwhites because the proportion of
white applicants accepted through UT’s holistic review process was greater than the
54. The data presented in Figure 3 is based upon my analysis of publicly available UT Austin
admissions data. See UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36, at 6, 8; West-Faulcon, supra
note 11, at 614, Figure 2.
55. See supra Figure 3.
56. See supra Figure 3. The white non-top 10% admissions rate was also almost 10 percentage
points higher than the admissions rate for international non-top 10% applicants. See supra Figure 3.
57. See supra Figure 3. The 12.7% admission rate for non-top 10% international students was
higher than the 8.8% African American admission rate and the 10.4% Latino admission rate. See supra
Figure 3.
58. Scholars like Goodwin Liu have long concluded that racial affirmative action is highly
unlikely to cause the rejection of an individual white applicant like Abigail Fisher. See generally, e.g.,
Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100
MICH. L. REV. 1045 (2002).
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proportion of nonwhites accepted holistically.59 Of the white students admitted to
UT when Abigail Fisher applied, a greater percentage were admitted under the raceconscious holistic review component of the UT admissions process than the
percentage of nonwhites selected under holistic review.
Figure 4.60

Thus, the percentage of students from each racial group admitted under raceconscious holistic review in Figure 4 reveals yet another white advantage. Whereas
one out of three (32.5%) of white applicants were admitted to holistic review slots,
only about one out of four (24.5%) of Asian American students, one out of five
(20.0%) Latino students, and less than one out of six (15.4%) African Americans
were selected under the race-conscious component of UT admissions.61 Within
59. The fact that white students had a numerical advantage in UT’s race-conscious process is
consistent with Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that Abigail Fisher would have had a better chance of
admission if UT had used its race-conscious holistic review to evaluate all Fall 2008 applicants. Fisher
II, 136 S. Ct. at 2202 (explaining that Abigail Fisher applied for admission to UT’s 2008 freshman class
but “was not in the top 10 percent of her high school graduating class, so she was evaluated for
admission through holistic, full-file review” and was rejected).
60. The data presented in Figure 4 is based upon my analysis of publicly available UT Austin
admissions data. See UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36, at 6, 8.
61. See supra Figure 4. Far from being a racial affirmative action policy that operated as a “setaside” for African American and Latino applicants, it could be argued that the holistic non-top 10%
component of UT Austin’s admission policy had the practical result of “setting-aside” more non-top
10% admission slots for whites than it did for nonwhites. Close to one-third of all the white applicants
admitted to UT Austin when Abigail Fisher applied were non-top 10% applicants whereas only one-
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racial groups, admitted white students were more likely to have been admitted under
UT’s race-conscious holistic review process than nonwhites. Alternatively, African
American, Latino, and Asian American students were more likely than whites to
have been selected solely based on class.
Figures 1–4 show that Fisher’s white racial group membership was an
advantage under UT’s race-conscious non-top 10% holistic review, not a hindrance.
Contrary to Justice Alito’s proclamation in his Fisher II dissent that UT’s policy
constituted affirmative action “gone wild,”62 the policy admitted substantially more
white students, numerically and by percentage, than African American, Latino, and
Asian American students.63 Far from constituting a racial classification that reduced
the admissions chances of whites, UT’s race-conscious holistic review resulted in
admission rate disparities sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Title VI
disparate impact law.64
C. The Racial Disparity Fisher II Should Have Considered
By applying strict scrutiny, Justice Kennedy adopts the framing that UT’s
holistic review was racial affirmative action that presumptively violated the equal

fifth or less of the African American and Latino students admitted were not ranked in the top 10% of
their high school graduating class.
62. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2232 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing UT’s holistic review
admissions policy as affirmative action “gone wild”).
63. See supra Figures 1, 2, and 3. It also admitted substantially more white students than Asian
American students numerically, although not by percentage. Id.
64. In 2001, in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001), Justice Scalia issued a ruling
on behalf of the Court that no private right of action exists to enforce Title VI disparate impact
regulations. In a dissent to the majority opinion in Sandoval, Justice Stevens suggested that rejected
applicants could bring Title VI effect discrimination cases under the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights statute
even though the Sandoval decision had eliminated plaintiffs’ direct cause of action to sue for Title VI
disparate impact discrimination. Id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Litigants who in the future wish to
enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only reference § 1983 to obtain
relief . . . .”). Whether a rejected applicant can privately sue a university under § 1983 for violating Title
VI disparate impact regulations has been rejected in some circuits but remains a possibility in others.
Specifically, the rule established by the Court in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe presents a considerable hurdle
to plaintiffs seeking to enforce disparate impact regulations using § 1983. See 536 U.S. 273, 287–88
(2002) (discussing only individual entitlements as being enforceable under § 1983). In fact, a number of
circuits have rejected Justice Stevens’s approach. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Detroit, 446 F.3d 614, 629
(6th Cir. 2006) (overruling Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 1994), and relying on
a combined reading of the Court’s decisions in Gonzaga and Sandoval to hold that a federal regulation
such as the U.S. Housing Act cannot independently create an enforceable § 1983 right); Save Our Valley
v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that disparate impact regulations are
unenforceable under § 1983); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771,
774 (3d Cir. 2001) (same); Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1010–11 (11th Cir. 1997) (same). However,
even if private enforcement of Title VI regulations is precluded by the Court’s ruling in Sandoval,
students rejected for admission may still file complaints with the U.S. Department of Education Office
of Civil Rights (OCR) alleging that the admissions policies of the university that rejected them had a
Title VI discriminatory effect on the basis of race.
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protection rights of white applicants.65 Kennedy applies strict scrutiny despite the
fact that UT’s race-conscious admissions policy did not negatively impact plaintiff
Abigail Fisher’s chances of admission to UT because she was white and despite the
fact that the holistic review process did not have any proven negative impact on
whites as a racial group. Figures 1–4 also show that the admissions outcomes under
UT’s race-conscious holistic review process bear no resemblance to the racial
breakdown of admissions rates to be expected under a robust and effective racial
affirmative action policy—a minimum of equal and, more likely, even higher
selection rates for the racial groups being targeted for inclusion by the affirmative
action policy. UT’s race-conscious holistic review had the exact opposite statistical
outcome.
UT admitted white holistic review applicants at not just a higher rate, but a
statistically significant higher rate, than similarly situated African Americans and
Latinos.66 Table 1 below shows UT’s race-conscious holistic review had a negative
impact on African American and Latino admission rates, not a positive one. The
table sets forth my original Title VI disparate impact analysis of the racial disparities
in Fall 2008 UT non-top 10% holistic review admissions.67 It reveals a magnitude

65. Kennedy does this when he treats the policy’s race consciousness at a racial classification
warranting strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (5th
ed. 2015) (explaining presumptions embedded in application of strict scrutiny standard of review).
66. Justice Alito is incorrect in his Fisher II dissent when he asserts repeatedly that UT’s
admissions policy racially discriminated against Asian Americans. The fall 2008 outcomes do not bear
that out. As I examine in detail in Obscuring Asian Penalty with Illusions of Black Bonus, Asian American
applicants were admitted at rates similar to white applicants under both the percentage plan and raceconscious holistic review admissions processes. See West-Faulcon, Obscuring Asian Penalty, supra note
11; see also Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2207 (“the contention that the University discriminates against AsianAmericans is ‘entirely unsupported by evidence in the record or empirical data’”) (citing Brief of Asian
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund et al. as Amicus Curiae 12).
67.
U.S. Department of Education regulations promulgated to enforce Title VI have been
interpreted to require federally funded universities to justify large racial disparities in admission rates.
See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (“No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”). Title VI disparate impact regulations prohibit federally funded universities from
using selection criteria in a manner that constitutes effect discrimination. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(vii)(2)
(2008) (stating that a recipient of federal funds may not “utilize criteria or methods of administration
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national
origin”). Id. A violation of Title VI regulations does not require proof of purposeful discrimination. See
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293–95, 295 n.11 (1985) (explaining Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)). In Guardians, a majority of the Court held that liability under Title VI
itself is identical to the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause in its requirement that
plaintiffs prove discriminatory purpose, while a different majority held that proof of discriminatory
effect suffices when the suit is brought to enforce regulations issued pursuant to Title VI. See Guardians,
463 U.S. at 608 n.1 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (detailing the multiple holdings of the Court). In
Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court assumed that proof of discriminatory impact was sufficient to
demonstrate a violation of the Title VI regulations. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281–82
(“[R]egulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI may validly proscribe activities that have a
disparate impact on racial groups . . . .”); see also Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending
Health Care Discrimination—It Shouldn’t Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 949 (1990) (“The
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of racially statistical disparity large enough to establish a prima facie violation of
Title VI disparate impact law and requiring justification if the university in question
receives federal funds.
Table 1.

Racially Disparate Impact Analysis of Fall 2008 UT Holistic Review68
Non-Top 10%
Applicants

% Admitted
(selection
rate)

African
American

8.8%

White

22.3%

Latino

10.4%

White

22.3%

Asian
American

21.7%

White

22.3%

4/5th Rule Violated
(< 80% or 0.80)

Chi Square
p value<0.01 is
significant

8.8/22.3 = 0.40
Yes, African
Americans selected
at less than 80%
(40%) of white
selection rate

158.06
p<0.00
(disparity in rates
is significant)

10.4/22.3 = .47
Yes, Latinos selected
at less than 80%
(47%) of white
selection rate

253.76
p<0.00
(disparity in rates
is significant)

21.7/22.3 = .97
No, Asian Americans
selected at 97%
(not less than 80%) of
white
selection rate

0.41
p=0.52
(disparity in rates
is NOT
significant)

Table 1 applies the “four-fifths (80%) rule”69 and the Pearson chi-square70
statistical test and finds a significant racially discriminatory effect against African

issue of whether Title VI and its implementing regulations proscribe unintentional discrimination with
a disproportionate adverse impact has had a tortured history in the Supreme Court.”).
68. See West-Faulcon, Forsaking Claims of Merit, supra note 6, at 353.
69. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2015) (explaining the “four-fifths rule” for adverse impact).
70. The more sophisticated chi square statistical test assesses the likelihood that the racial
disparity in the admission rate outcomes of UT’s fall 2008 admissions cycle—the fact that whites were
admitted at twice the rate as Blacks and Latinos—was a random or chance event. Chi-square analysis
tests the likelihood that the racial disparities in UT admission rates are a product of random chance
versus potential evidence of racial discrimination. The chi-square analysis in Table 1 rejects the
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Americans and Latinos within the meaning of Title VI disparate impact law.71 It
does not reveal a statistically significant difference between the Asian American
admission rate and the white admission rate.72
The “% Admitted” column in Table 1 compares the African American,
Latino, and Asian American selection rates to the selection rate for white raceconscious holistic review applicants. The “4/5th Rule Violated” column is my
calculation of the ratio of the African American, Latino, and Asian American
selection rates and the higher white selection rate. The “Chi Square” column shows
the chi square value and whether the corresponding p value is less than 0.01. A p
value less than 0.01 means the racial disparity between the nonwhite admission rate
and the white admission rate did not happen by chance.
Under the 80% rule, the selection rate ratio comparing the selection rate for
non-top 10% African American applicants to the white selection rate is 40% (8.8%
divided by 22.3%)—far less than 80%; the Latino-white selection rate ratio is only
47% (10.4% divided by 22.3%)—also far less than 80%. By contrast, the ratio
comparing the white-Asian American holistic review selection rate is 97% (21.7%
divided by 22.3%)—significantly higher than 80%.73 The chi square analysis results
of 158.06 and 253.76 for the comparisons of the white selection rate to the African
American and Latino selection rates, respectively, result in p values much lower than
0.01 in both instances and thus are statistically significant. By contrast, the p value
of 0.52 associated with the chi square of 0.41 for the small difference between the
Asian American selection rate and the white selection rate is greater than 0.01 and
therefore not statistically significant. The analysis in Table 1 shows that the
disparities between the African American and Latino holistic review selection rates
and the white holistic review selection rate are of such a magnitude that an African
American or Latino student denied admission along with Abigail Fisher could
establish sufficient adverse impact to allege UT’s race-conscious holistic review
violated their civil rights under Title VI disparate impact law.
Table 1’s analysis also confirms what is intuitive. Selecting African American
or Latino applicants at half of the rate of white applicants constitutes a degree of
hypothesis that the disparities between the lower African American and Latino admission rates are the
result of random chance. See supra Table 1.
71. The Court has treated the 80% test as a “rule of thumb” that permits plaintiffs to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VI disparate impact law when a racial group is admitted
at less than 8% of the admit rate of the racial group with the highest selection rate. See Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977) (observing that when expected results and actual results differ
by more than two or three standard deviations, the statistical disparity in selection rates
constitutes evidence of a Title VI disparate impact). Courts have interpreted Title VI to require that the
racial disparity exist not just within the overall applicant pool but also within the subpopulation of
“qualified” applicants. In other words, there is proof of Title VI discriminatory effect if, considering
only qualified applicants, the racial disparities are large enough to be statistically significant.
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307–08 (1977) (“Where gross statistical
disparities can be shown, they alone may . . . constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of
discrimination.”).
72. See West-Faulcon, Obscuring Asian Penalty, supra note 11.
73. Id.
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disparity of a magnitude that is exceedingly unlikely to be due to chance. Yet, in
Fisher II, UT’s policy was subject to the doctrinal presumption that UT violated the
equal protection rights of rejected white applicant Abigail Fisher—by the Court’s
application of the strict scrutiny standard. The Court’s treatment of UT’s holistic
review as a racial classification warranting strict scrutiny to protect Fisher from
racial discrimination demonstrates how strongly equal protection doctrine favors
reverse discrimination claims, even if whites suffer no disadvantage from a policy’s
race consciousness.
II. THE NON-CLASSIFYING RACE CONSCIOUSNESS OF UT’S HOLISTIC REVIEW
Contrary to claims of Fisher and several amici that UT employed anti-white
and anti-Asian American racial preferences,74 Part I demonstrated quantitatively
that UT’s holistic review was racially preferential to whites, not African Americans
and Latinos—admitting the former at twice the rate of the latter two groups. This
Part takes a qualitative look at the Fall 2008 UT admissions process to further
illuminate the inappropriateness of the Court’s categorization of UT’s minimally
race-conscious holistic review as a racial classification under equal protection
analysis.75 Next, this Part asserts that the Court’s current reversed equal protection
doctrine should be corrected to avoid the perverse doctrinal double standard
exposed by Fisher II—an inappropriately low evidentiary burden on reverse
discrimination plaintiffs to demonstrate the existence of a racial classification and
an inappropriately high one for traditional discrimination plaintiffs.
Over the strong objection of dissenting justices,76 the Court treats all racebased affirmative action policies as racial classifications without regard to the
74. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 22; Brief for Richard Sander and Stuart
Taylor as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 9, at 3–5.
75. For the Court’s early articulation of the rationale for applying heightened scrutiny to racial
classifications, see U.S. v. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The Court’s flawed application of strict
scrutiny in Korematsu led the Court to hold that the race and national origin-based internment of all
persons of Japanese descent was justified under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. In Fisher II, the Court
treated UT’s holistic admissions policy as a racial classification but held that the UT policy considered
race in a sufficiently restrained manner to satisfy the Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325, “narrowly tailored”
requirement. Prior to 1996, UT’s law school considered race as an admissions criterion for the purpose
of increasing the admission rate of African American and Latino applicants. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). In 1992, Cheryl Hopwood, a white applicant denied admission to the
University of Texas School of Law, sued the law school contending its consideration of race to benefit
nonwhite applicants violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 938. After the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the law school’s consideration of race constituted a “racial
preference” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, UT completely eliminated race as an admissions
criterion. In 1997, after UT eliminated all race consciousness from its admissions policy, the Texas
Legislature passed HB 588, a law that defined admissions-related merit exclusively as having a high
class rank. See id. at 962.
76. See, e.g., J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 535-536, 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that
intermediate scrutiny should apply to “race-conscious classifications designed to further remedial
goals,” and critiques the application of strict scrutiny because doing so renders the seemingly illogical
conclusion “that remedial classifications warrant no different standard of review under the Constitution
than the most brutal and repugnant forms of state-sponsored racism”).
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magnitude of the policy’s race-consciousness and has not required the reverse
discrimination claimant to prove the affirmative action policy in question
unjustifiably reduced his or her admission chances on the basis of race.77 In so
doing, the Court has transformed the Equal Protection Clause—a provision
conferring full citizenship to all persons born in the U.S. and protecting them from
government-driven racial subordination78—into a weapon for eradicating raceconscious affirmative action on the theory that any consideration of race poses
imminent danger of race discrimination against whites.79 As a result, the theory that
a race-conscious effort to include nonwhites is, in and of itself, a form of race
discrimination against whites has gained wider acceptance.80 The facts in Fisher offer
a strong counter to the presumption that any degree of race-consciousness warrants
the Court’s most stringent level of review. UT’s holistic review limited the degree
to which admissions officers could consider race and also relied so heavily on nonracial considerations that both should have prompted the Court to adopt a more
nuanced doctrinal approach.
A new impact requirement for reverse discrimination claims should require a
showing of a particular degree of racially adverse impact on whites as a racial group
in order for the Court to treat the race-conscious policy in questions as a racial
classification triggering strict scrutiny.81 If the Court were to adopt such an
evidentiary standard, it would be more consistent with Justice Kennedy’s
acknowledgement in Fisher II that UT’s race-conscious holistic review offered more
advantages to Abigail Fisher than the race-blind class rank-based top 10% policy.
Details missing from Kennedy’s analysis in Fisher II could have driven this point
even further. Factual details about the specific degree of race consciousness and the
77. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (highly selective nature of Univ. of Michigan’s undergraduate
admissions policy made it difficult for students with Gratz’s credentials to gain admission);
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (policy only required white contractors hire a relatively small percentage
of nonwhite subcontractors and also permitted waivers for white contractors unable to do so); Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (age not race most likely reason for Allan Bakke’s rejection).
78. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 307-308 (1880)) (“The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they
contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race—the
right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored—exemption from
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of
the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the
condition of a subject race.”). In Strauder v. West, the Court observed, “[t]he true spirit and meaning
of the amendments . . . cannot be understood without keeping in view the history of the times when
they were adopted and the general objects they plainly sought to accomplish.” 100 U.S. at 306.
79. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 525 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (expressing
concern that racial affirmative action violates the Equal Protection Clause because it is operates to “act
to the detriment” of whites based on their race).
80. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288–300 (explaining rationale for applying strict scrutiny to UC
Davis medical school race-based affirmative action policy).
81. Robinson, supra note 10, at 172 (“[R]ace-conscious policies that seek to promote diversity
or remedy past discrimination are the primary site of contemporary racial classification and Supreme
Court scrutiny.”). Professor Robinson has observed that “when strict scrutiny appears in the Court’s
race jurisprudence today, it is almost invariably on behalf of white litigants such as Abigail Fisher, who
wield it to dismantle affirmative action policies.” Id.
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overall context and manner in which a policy permits race to be considered are
factors that should be used to limit strict scrutiny to policies that have harmed or
have some realistic potential to harm whites.
A. Missing Details of UT’s Holistic Review
UT’s holistic review was substantially more limited in its race consciousness
than Justice Kennedy’s Fisher II description suggests. While Kennedy set forth
important details about how UT considered race to derive the only permissibly raceconscious factor in UT’s holistic review—an applicant’s Personal Achievement
Index (PAI) score, he omitted the key contextual detail that the PAI score had only
a limited role in where an application landed on an admissions decision grid.82
1. AI Score Columns, PAI Score Rows, and the Decision Line
The Academic Index (AI) score was an SAT- and class rank-driven prediction
of the future college freshman-year GPA of the applicant, ranging from 0.00 to
4.10.83 To calculate AI score, admissions officers inputted high school class rank,
high school class size, SAT verbal score, and SAT math score into one of four
possible regression equations depending upon the applicant’s intended
undergraduate major.84 For instance, the AI score of an applicant applying to UT’s
undergraduate business major was generated using the following equation:
Predicted Freshman GPA = -2.31253 + (SAT V * 0.00157) + (SAT M * 0.00229)
+ (HSR * 0.03419). An additional tenth of a point could be added to the resulting
82. Cf. UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36, at 3 (explaining that academic index
scores and personal achievement index scores “are then plotted on an admissions decision grid” and
“[a]dmissions liaisons, and/or representatives of Deans’ offices or faculty, then make decisions as to
which cells [of the admissions decision grid] to select as admitted students”).
83. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
84. The four AI score equations used by UT in Fall 2008 were as follows. For Liberal Arts,
Communications, Fine Arts, Social Work, and Education Majors: Predicted Freshman GPA =
-0.19949 + (SAT V * 0.00142) + (SAT M * 0.00191) + (HSR * 0.01459). For Nursing, Natural Sciences,
and Architecture Majors: Predicted Freshman GPA = -1.10339 + (SAT V * 0.00088166) + (SAT M *
0.00230) + (HSR * 0.02416). For Engineering Majors: Predicted Freshman GPA =
-1.53545 + (SAT V * 0.00072937) + (SAT M * 0.00313) + (HSR * 0.02285). For Business Majors:
Predicted Freshman GPA = -2.31253 + (SAT V * 0.00157) + (SAT M * 0.00229) + (HSR * 0.03419).
See UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36, at 5. A significant portion of selective universities
use a regression equation combining applicant SAT scores with high school grade point averages (not
necessarily class rank as done by UT) to create a numerical composite index score that predicts
freshman-year college grades for the applicant, then proceed to use those predictions to compare and
rank applicants quantitatively. Abigail Fisher may very well be an example of a candidate for whom a
university’s overreliance on SAT scores unfairly undermined her selection because, as I have explained
elsewhere, this by-the-numbers, formula-driven prediction of a high school applicant’s future grades in
college is useful but imperfect. See Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps
State Anti-Affirmative Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075, 1114–15 (2009) (“A major ostensible
reason that colleges require applicants to take the SAT is that an applicant’s SAT score offers admissions
officers information that assists them in predicting whether a student is likely to succeed at their
institution. Educational-measurement experts produce institution-specific data about the future success
of high-school students by comparing the entering SAT scores of prior applicants with their first-year
grades during college.”).
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number if the applicant “exceeded UT’s required high school curriculum.”85 The
record in the Fisher litigation did not reveal the predictive power of UT’s AI score.
Generally, such regression equation-based predictions of first-year college GPA
explain less than one quarter of the variation in high school students’ early college
grades.86
UT used a different equation to generate an applicant’s PAI score. That
equation was PAI = [(PAS *4)+(essay score average*3)]/7,87 requiring admissions
officers to input the average of an applicant’s scores on two required essays and the
applicant’s assigned Personal Achievement Score (PAS). The PAS was a score
assigned by admissions officers based on evaluation of information the applicant
submitted relevant to six non-academic personal achievement categories. Those six
PAS categories were (1) leadership, (2) extracurricular activities, (3) awards/honors,
(4) work experience, (5) service to school or community, and (6) special
circumstances.88 Both the PAI score and the PAS ranged from 1.0 to 6.0.
The last PAS category—“special circumstances”—permitted, but did not
require, admissions readers to increase an applicant’s PAS based on an evaluation
of some, all, or none of seven special circumstances factors. Those seven factors
were (1) the socioeconomic status of the applicant’s family, (2) the socioeconomic
status of the applicant’s school, (3) the applicant’s family responsibilities, (4)
whether the applicant lives in a single-parent home, (5) the applicant’s SAT score
in relation to the average SAT score of the applicant’s high school, (6) the language
spoken at the applicant’s home, and (7) the applicant’s race.89
Kennedy’s Fisher II description of “admission officers from each school
within the University set[ting] a cutoff PAI/AI score combination for
admission, and then admit[ting] all of the applicants who are above the cutoff
point”90 obfuscates how little potential there was for race to impact the ultimate
grid-based UT admissions decision. Even though UT’s holistic review did involve
an admissions officer conducting a “full-file review,”91 whether an application was

85. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
86. The vast majority of variation among the grades of college freshman is explained by
variables other than SAT score and class rank.
87. See Affidavit of Kedra B. Ishop at 2, Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (No. 1:08-CV-00263SS) [hereinafter Ishop Affidavit].
88. Id.
89. The Fisher litigation was an equal protection challenge of UT’s inclusion of race as the last
of seven non-mandatory, permissible special circumstances factors.
90. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207. The Court elaborated on the fact that admissions officers did
not consider race in any way in selecting the AI-PAI cutoff score. On this point, the Court noted that
“[i]n setting the cutoff, those admissions officers only know how many applicants received a given
PAI/AI score combination.” Id. (“The admissions officers who make the final decision as to whether
a particular applicant will be admitted make that decision without knowing the applicant’s race.”).
91. Id. at 6.
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to the left (accepted)92 or right (rejected) 93 of a “decision line”94 determined
admission. The decision line was drawn by admissions officers to choose enough
applications to fill the small number of admissions slots in each major that were left
after automatic Ten Percent Plan admissions.95 Figure 5 is an example of a UT
admissions decision grid.
Figure 5.

The one-digit numbers on the grid in Figure 5 indicate the number of
applications with the AI score and PAI score combination corresponding to
particular AI column and PAI row coordinates on the grid.96 This means, for
example, the number “1” in AI score column labeled “370” and the top PAI score
row (not labeled) indicates one holistic review applicant was assigned an AI score
of 370 and the highest PAI score of 6 (indicated by placement in the 6th highest
row).97 Since admissions officers had only knowledge of the number of applicants
within each grid cell98 and had no knowledge of the race or any other aspect of the
92. See UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36, at 3 (“The most-qualified candidates
are located in the cells closest to the upper left corner.”); see also Memorandum in Support of
Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment at 17, Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 1:08-CV-00263-SS).
93. See UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36, at 3 (describing how rejected
applicants are either: (1) “cascaded” to their second-preferred major; (2) offered Summer Freshman
Admission; or (3) offered CAP at another UT system school).
94. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 29, at 26.
95. Ishop Affidavit, supra note 88, at Ex. B.
96. Id. The grid columns are labeled with numbers corresponding with the range of AI scores,
predicted freshman GPA, (0.0 to 4.10) multiplied by 100 across the top horizontally—the
highest possible number was 410 and the lowest was 000 (although the grid stopped at <240). The grid
rows from bottom to top correspond with the range of PAI scores (1 to 6)—the highest row
corresponds to the highest PAI score.
97. Cells closer to the top left corner of the grid, those corresponding with a higher AI and
higher PAI scores, were the most likely to be admitted, space permitting. See UT Freshmen Fall 2008
Report, supra note 36, at 3.
98. See id. (“Admissions liaisons, and/or representatives of Deans’ offices or faculty, then make
decisions as to which cells to select as admitted students.”).
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identity of the individuals in the cells being selected for admission,99 the decisional
stage of UT’s holistic review was not race conscious.100
2. Heavy Weight and Impact of AI Score
Although Justice Kennedy was correct to observe that Fisher’s chances of
admission to UT would have been improved if UT had used holistic review to admit
a larger proportion of the class, Kennedy did not point out how minimally the
discretionary consideration of race factored in UT’s holistic review or how much
SAT score and class rank predominated which students were selected for holistic
review admission. Holistic review factors such as student essays, leadership
participation, sports involvement, community service, and letters of
recommendation influenced an applicant’s selection or rejection under holistic
review far less than SAT scores, GPA, and class rank. The great weight afforded the
AI score—the completely race-blind, SAT score-driven component of holistic
review—meant an applicant’s AI score influenced final positioning on the
admissions decision grid much more than the personal-achievement-focused and
potentially race-conscious PAI score, further demonstrating the minimal role race
played in UT’s holistic review.101
In addition, Kennedy’s Fisher II opinion neglected to explain how much more
the AI score, as compared to the PAI score, impacted whether an application fell in
an “accepted” position on the UT decision grid. As can be seen in Figure 5 above,
it took a ten times greater difference in an applicant’s PAI score—one whole
point—to move the applicant into a higher row on the grid.102 As a consequence,
only a large difference in PAI score, which would be contingent on a very large
difference in PAS, would be sufficient to impact the ultimate admissions decision
for a particular applicant. In stark contrast, a very small difference in an applicant’s
AI score—just one tenth of a point (since AI scores were multiplied by 100 before
plotting on a grid)—could change the right-to-left column position of an
application on the UT admissions decision grid. In other words, if an applicant’s
race-blind AI score was low, having a high PAI score did not matter at all.
99. Again, admissions officers only knew how many applicants “landed” in that cell after their
combination of the first-year college predicted GPA and personal achievement overall score had been
plotted on the UT admissions grid. See id.
100. Justice Kennedy’s description of the holistic process in Fisher II failed to explain that the
final stage of that process was based on the drawing of a decision line on the admissions grid for the
majors to which Fisher applied and was thus a completely race-blind decision.
101. Because Fisher was ineligible for Ten Percent Plan automatic admission and also ineligible
for high AI score automatic admission, her only route to admission was through UT’s holistic review
process.
102. The highest PAI score of 6.0 would locate an application in the top row on the admissions
decision grid whereas a PAI score of 1.0 would place an application in the lowest row of the grid. See
Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 20, Fisher, 645 F.
Supp. 2d at 587 (No. 1:08-CV-00263-SS) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts]. (“One-tenth of
an AI [academic index score] point or one PAI [personal achievement index score] point can be
determinative as to whether an applicant is admitted or not admitted.”).
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Abigail Fisher’s rejection by UT bears this out. It was Fisher’s AI score, not
her potentially race-conscious PAI score, that resulted in her rejection. With an AI
score of 3.1, Fisher’s application would have been located in the AI column labeled
“310.” Because so many applicants with significantly higher SAT scores had applied
to both the Liberal Arts and Business school majors, Fisher’s application location
would have been too far right on the admissions grid to be on the left side of the
decision line, irrespective of whether it was located in the highest PAI row of six.
As explained by UT, Fisher “would not have been admitted to the Fall 2008
freshman class even if she had received ‘a “perfect” PAI score of 6.’”103 Thus, not
only was there a mathematical limit on how much the minimally race-conscious PAS
could impact the PAI score—the PAI score (itself, even less determined by race
than PAS) counted for only four-sevenths of an applicant’s PAS and not more,104
there was a mathematical limit on how much the PAI score could impact the
location of an application on the decision grid.
Other details of UT’s admissions policy also demonstrate how significantly an
applicant’s race-blind, SAT-driven AI score impacted admission. AI score alone
determined the admission of some applicants. If they had a sufficiently high AI
score, applicants were called “‘A’ group applicants” and were automatically admitted
while applicants whose AI scores were deemed too low were referred to as “‘C’
group applicants” and were deemed “presumptively inadmissible.”105 For Fall 2008
admissions, applicants with an AI score of 2.599 or lower were designated “C”
group applicants and, thus, considered presumptively ineligible for admission.106
Those applicants fitting in neither the “A” nor “C” groups—presumably “B” group
applicants—were eligible to be considered under holistic review. Despite it further
demonstrating the exceedingly minimal role that race played in UT admissions, the
fact that holistic review was actually conducted for only a subset of holistic review
applicants—such B group applicants—was not mentioned in the Fisher II majority
opinion.
The Court’s Fisher II decision likewise made no mention of, nor did UT
emphasize, the fact that five of UT’s undergraduate majors “admitted applicants
automatically on a rolling basis if their AI score exceeded a particular threshold (so103. Brief for Respondents, supra note 29, at 15 (“The summary judgment record is
uncontradicted that—due to the stiff competition in 2008 and petitioner’s relatively low AI score—
petitioner would not have been admitted to the Fall 2008 freshman class even if she had received ‘a
“perfect” PAI score of 6.’”). This suggests that Abigail Fisher did not have particularly high written
essay scores or her AI score was so low that it situated her on the wrong side of the applicable decision
line on the admissions decision grid for the UT majors to which Fisher applied. Even an applicant with
a perfect personal achievement sub-score of 6.0 would not have a high personal achievement overall
score if that applicant’s two written essay scores were middling on the scale of one to six points.
104. Because PAI = [(PAS * 4)+(essay score average * 3)]/7, PAS was four-sevenths of PAS
and the average of the applicant’s two essay scores was three-sevenths. See Ishop Affidavit, supra note
88.
105. Defendants’ Statement of Facts at 16, Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (No. 1:08-CV-00263SS).
106. Id.
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called “A” group applicants).”107 UT never disclosed the number of such
automatically admitted students for Fall 2008—the number of applicants admitted
based solely on “high AI” score.108 What is known is that applicants to Natural
Sciences were admitted automatically if they had an AI score of 3.5 or higher, to
Geosciences with an AI score of 3.6 or higher, to Liberal Arts with an AI score of
3.9 or higher, to Social Work with an AI score of 3.6 or higher, to Education in
Applied Learning & Development with an AI score of 3.6 or higher, and to
Education in Special Education with an AI score of 3.4 or higher.109
The major role that the SAT score-driven AI score had on admission is clear
from how it impacted Abigail Fisher’s application to UT. Fisher’s SAT score was
1180 (out of 1600),110 whereas the average SAT score of all Fall 2008 non-top 10%
applicants who went on to enroll at UT was 1285.111 Fisher’s less than stellar SAT
score resulted in a less than stellar AI score—a predicted freshman-year GPA of
3.1.112 Since Fisher applied to UT to major in either Liberal Arts or Business, she
was compared to a particularly high AI score cohort.
The School of Business, in particular, was so popular among UT applicants
that the number of Top Ten Percent Plan admissions was capped at “75% of the
program’s available admission slots” such that only a small portion of even the top
10% applicants who wished to major in Business could be admitted. As a result,
only those applicants who “graduated within approximately the top 4% of their high
school class and selected a business major as their first choice”113 were actually
admitted to UT’s Business major through the top 10% automatic process. The
107. Id. (“After all admissions offers based solely on academic performance (either pursuant to
the Top ten percent rule or due to the applicant’s high AI) were made for the Fall 2008 entering
freshmen class, only 841 available admissions slots (out of a possible 10,200) remained open for Texas
residents.”).
108. Id. at 14.
109. Id.
110. Fisher’s score on the verbal/reading section of the SAT was 500, and her score on the
math section was 680. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 22. The year before Fisher applied,
only 33.3% of the students admitted for non-top 10% fall admission had SAT scores as low as or
lower than Fisher’s 1180. See THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS,
THE PERFORMANCE OF STUDENTS ATTENDING THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN AS A
RESULT OF THE COORDINATE ADMISSION PROGRAM (CAP) STUDENTS APPLYING AS FRESHMEN
2007 REPORT 7, at 4 tbl.5 (Feb. 8, 2010) [hereinafter APPLYING AS FRESHMEN 2007], https://
s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.utexas.edu/ContentPages/55689852.pdf [https://
perma.cc/35SB-QTJU]. The percentage was even lower for 2007 Summer Freshmen admissions—
only 29.3% had SAT scores of 1190 or lower. Id.
111. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 4; UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT,
supra note 36, at 9.
112. See Brief for Amici Curiae National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
Texas State Conference of NAACP Branches and Barbara Bader in Support of Respondents at 6,
Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (No. 1:08-CV-00263-SS) (explaining that Fisher’s AI score of 3.1 was
too low to qualify for “A” group admission). The Texas State NAACP amicus brief also noted: “Race
played no part whatsoever in the calculation of the AI. ‘A’ group applicants had high AIs, and were
offered admission to UT automatically on a rolling basis. JA 434a. Petitioner was not an ‘A’ group
applicant, thus, she again failed to qualify for automatic admission.” Id.
113. Id. at 15.
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“remaining 25% of the slots” to the School of Business were filled using holistic
review. Non-top 10% applicants like Abigail Fisher seeking to be Business majors
had to compete against the remaining top 10% applicants who selected Business as
their first choice major but were not admitted under the Ten Percent Plan. This
meant Fisher’s class rank of 12% and her AI score of 3.1 was significantly lower
than many applicants to the Business major who were students ranked between the
top 5% and 10% of their graduating class. Fisher’s situation was similar with respect
to the Liberal Arts major. The cutoff for automatic admission as a UT Liberal Arts
major was an AI score of 3.9 or higher. Here again, Fisher’s AI score of 3.1 did not
make her particularly competitive.
Given the explicit mathematical limitations on the weight that race could
have on any applicant’s PAI score and the decision grid coordinate location
limitations on the impact an applicant’s PAI score could have on whether he or she
was ultimately admitted, the Fisher case presented a novel legal question that the
Court treated with its traditional presumption that any race-conscious policy is
necessarily a racial classification. When a government policy is, first, only facially
very minimally race conscious as well as adopted for a racially inclusive purpose and,
second, the plaintiff presents no evidence that the challenged policy has had a
racially disparate impact on the racial group to which the plaintiff belongs, the Court
should reexamine its current approach of presuming such a policy constitutes a
racial classification.
B. High Doctrinal Hurdle Imposed on Traditional Discrimination Claims
The amount of weight UT’s holistic review process gives to SAT scores is
unlikely to be scientifically justified given that SAT scores only explain 13% of the
variation in high school students’ first-year college grades.114 Other admissions
criteria, particularly high school GPA, explain more of the variation in first-year
college grades, are equally-available, and would likely result in a less racially disparate
impact on African American and Latino applicants.115 Since as much as 87% of the
114. Because the SAT test, considered alone, explains only approximately 13% of the variation
in a test-taker’s college grades, it leaves 87% of the difference in freshman grades “unaccounted for and
unexplained by consideration of applicants’ SAT score by itself.” Kimberly West-Faulcon, More
Intelligent Design: Testing Measures of Merit, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1235, 1264–68 (2011); see also WestFaulcon, The River Runs Dry, supra note 85, at 1116 (explaining that the SAT explains an additional
13% of the variance in first-year college grades as compared to the predictive power of relying on
applicants’ high school grades alone).
115. “At the end of the roughly hundred-year period that mass-marketed standardized tests
have been in existence, their predictive power still leaves substantial room for improvement.” Far from
perfect in its prediction, the 13% power of predicting first-year college GPA based on SAT score and
the 23% predictive power of using SAT score combined with high school GPA to predict the same
early college outcome is helpful but not complete information for universities to use in assessing the
academic merit of applicants. See West-Faulcon, More Intelligent Design, supra note 115, at 1264–69
(examining modern innovation in mental testing in light of the fact that conventional standardized tests
like the SAT “leave more of the variation in intelligence and future academic success unexplained than
they actually explain”). Richard Atkinson is the former president of the University of California and an
expert in cognitive science and psychology. During his presidency, Atkinson gave a speech critical of
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variation in freshman-year college grades is explained by non-SAT factors,116 racial
disparities in selection stemming from over-reliance on SAT scores likely require
justification under disparate impact law.117
If one of the many African American and Latino applicants denied admission
the year Fisher applied had sought to challenge his or her rejection as violating the
Equal Protection Clause because UT’s holistic review process inappropriately overrelied on SAT scores, the Court’s current doctrine imposes an evidentiary burden
on traditional discrimination plaintiffs—the discriminatory purpose requirement—
that essentially dooms their claim from the outset.118 The purpose requirement
imposed on such traditional discrimination plaintiffs, but not reverse discrimination
plaintiffs, is a nearly impenetrable barrier to traditional race discrimination claims.119
The reasons it is difficult to prove racially discriminatory purpose include: (1) the
fact that perpetrators of purposeful race discrimination are increasingly
sophisticated in camouflaging it with facially race neutral explanations,120 (2) that
much of modern race discrimination is the product of implicit or unconscious racial
bias,121 and (3) that many decision-making systems rely on racially-skewed
standardized test results in a scientifically unjustified, but not purposefully racially
discriminatory, manner.122
As noted in Justice Samuel Alito’s Fisher II dissent,123 questions about the
predictive value and potential racial bias in how UT holistic review relied upon SAT

the amount of weight placed on SAT scores in college admissions and announced plans to no longer
require students applying to take the SAT I. See Richard C. Atkinson, President, Univ. of Cal.,
Standardized Tests and Access to American Universities, The 2001 Robert H. Atwell Distinguished
Lecture at the 83rd Annual Meeting of the American Council on Education (Feb. 18, 2001), http://
www.ucop.edu/news/sat/speech.html [https://perma.cc/MLR5-YQTN].
116. See West-Faulcon, More Intelligent Design, supra note 115, at 1268.
117. Id. at 1291 (describing potential claims by “such rejected African-American and Latino
applicants [who] could file Title VI disparate impact complaints with the Department of Education
Office of Civil Rights”).
118. See Davis, 426 U.S. 229; Feeney, 442 U.S. 256.
119. Most challenges of a racial classification under the Equal Protection Clause decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court in the last forty years have been reverse discrimination claims. See, e.g., Fisher II,
136 S. Ct. 2198; Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411; Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Bakke, 438 U.S.
265; DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321–22 (1987) (describing
this pattern).
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the
Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010).
122. See West-Faulcon, More Intelligent Design, supra note 115, at 1269; see also West-Faulcon
Fisher I Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 19–20 (discussing the predictive limitations of the SAT scores
and contrasting them with more predictive and less racially skewed standardized tests based on more
accurate theories of intelligence).
123. Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in Fisher II actually focuses heavily on the role that SAT
scores play in UT’s holistic review and even connects the SAT-driven nature of UT’s holistic review
with the exclusion of African American and Latino applicants. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2227 n.5.
However, it should be noted that Alito includes this discussion in service of his overarching, incorrect
claim that UT’s race-consciousness in holistic review racially discriminates against Asian American
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scores warrant consideration.124 Alito scrutinizes UT’s use of SAT scores to
challenge the university’s assertion that it needed to be race conscious in order to
admit African American and Latino high school students with high SAT scores.
Although Justice Alito only discusses the SAT to demonstrate why Abigail Fisher’s
reverse discrimination claim should have succeeded,125 it is worth noting that Alito’s
SAT discussion in Fisher II illuminates the doctrinal implications of the Court’s
reversed equal protection jurisprudence as well as the types of racially disparate
impacts that stem from over-reliance on SAT scores.
Alito’s Fisher II dissent challenges whether UT needs to use SAT scores and
whether using them racially discriminates against African American and Latino
applicants to support his view that UT failed to proffer a compelling purpose for
its use of race. However, had Alito been analyzing the claim of a rejected African
American applicant who contended UT’s over-reliance on the SAT violated her
equal protection rights, the Court’s equal protection doctrine would have warranted
only rational basis review,126 according to Washington v. Davis precedent.127 Under
weak rational basis review, Justice Alito would no doubt accept UT’s contention
that it needed to maximize SAT scores and thereby reject the African American
applicant’s discrimination claim. By contrast, under the stringent strict scrutiny
review automatically afforded to reverse discrimination claimants without regard to
whether race actually affected white applicants, Alito was no doubt willing to use
strict scrutiny to doctrinally second-guess UT’s claim that it needed to maximize
SAT scores. Ironically,128 Alito invoked the notion that UT’s reliance on SAT scores
applicants to UT. Id. As the analysis in Figures 1-4 and Table 1 show clearly, there is no empirical
support for Justice Alito’s assertions regarding massive discrimination against Asian Americans.
124. Alito does so to support his claim that UT’s interest in intraracial diversity or “diversity
within diversity” is not a compelling interest. Id. at 2238 (Alito, J., dissenting). Alito’s opinion is replete
with bald assertions that Asian Americans were the victims of racial discrimination based on no
statistical evidence of the rate at which Asian Americans were admitted. Id. at 2209, 2218, 2223–27.
125. In other words, my use of Alito’s SAT critique herein is vastly different from his own.
Alito’s opinion paints UT as an institution that racially discriminates against Asian Americans, a claim
that is inconsistent with the data presented in Figures 1–4 above. Id. at 2223–27. Here, I reference
Alito’s observations about the SAT as the type of claims a rejected African American or Latino applicant
might rely upon in challenging UT’s holistic review as racially discriminating against his or her race.
Even though Justice Alito explicitly rejects “maximizing admittees’ SAT scores” as a compelling
government interest and distinguishes UT’s interest in high SAT scores from UT’s true compelling
interest “in admitting students who will achieve academic success,” id. at 2234, he only does so in service
of Fisher’s reverse discrimination claim.
126. See Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111–17 (1949) (setting forth the Court’s
highly deferential rational basis standard of review).
127. In Washington v. Davis, the Court deferred to the District of Columbia’s use of a test that
rejected African American applicants claimed was not job-related. Davis, 426 U.S. at 288 (applying
rational basis review to reject claim of African American applicants contending test use to select police
officers was not “job-related”).
128. While Justice Alito finds it “more than a little ironic” that UT asserts a compelling interest
in considering race so as to admit African American and Latino applicants with high SAT scores, Alito’s
invocation of the fact that the SAT has “often been accused of reflecting racial and cultural bias” against
African Americans and Latinos to explain why he would have ruled in favor of a white applicant
claiming race discrimination is itself quite ironic. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2234, 2234 n.11 (citing Roy
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could be biased against African Americans and Latinos to support Abigail Fisher’s
claim of anti-white bias.
Thus, despite the evidence of racially discriminatory effect on African
American and Latino applicants shown in Table 1,129 the Court’s requirement that
traditional equal protection plaintiffs prove discriminatory purpose operates to
absolve UT of any obligation to justify it systematically lower acceptance rates for
those groups.130 The upshot is that the Court’s reversed equal protection doctrine
permits Abigail Fisher’s equal protection challenge to proceed, irrespective of her
admissions-related merit and irrespective of the fact that race played no role in
Fisher’s rejection. The fact that UT’s holistic review had a racially disparate impact
on African Americans and Latinos, that UT’s holistic review relied very heavily on
SAT scores, and that UT’s holistic review made SAT scores determinative of
admission in a manner unlikely to be scientifically justifiable would be doctrinally
insufficient to trigger the plaintiff-friendly strict scrutiny standard of review were a
rejected African American or Latino applicant to sue UT for violating the Equal
Protection Clause.
C. Justice Kennedy’s Continued Empathy for Reverse Discrimination
Claims and Claimants
Although Justice Kennedy observed in Inclusive Communities that “mere
awareness of race” in attempting to solve a problem “does not doom the endeavor
at the outset,”131 he has long had concerns about “the dangers” presented by
government use of “individual [racial] classifications.”132 In rejecting Abigail

O. Freedle, Correcting the SAT’s Ethnic and Social-Class Bias: A Method for Reestimating SAT Scores,
73 HARV. ED. REV. 1 (2003)).
129. See supra Table 1.
130. Under the Court’s reversed equal protection jurisprudence, empirically-substantiated race
impacts in death penalty sentences were reviewed under the weak rational basis standard. See McCleskey,
481 U.S. at 297–99.
131. In Tex. Dep’t. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project Inc., Justice
Kennedy explicitly rejected the notion that government race-consciousness is a per se constitutional or
statutory violation when observed that “race may be considered in certain circumstances and in a proper
fashion” and “mere awareness of race” in attempting to solve a problem “does not doom that endeavor
at the outset.” 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2015). UT’s holistic review policy evidently satisfied Kennedy’s
requirement that government refrain from race consciousness such that an individual may “find his
own identify, can define her own persona, without state intervention that classifies on the basis of his
race or the color of her skin.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 797 (2007).
132. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In Fisher I,
Kennedy criticized the lower court for being too deferential in its application of the strict scrutiny
standard. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. It is beyond the scope of this Article to challenge Justice Kennedy’s
application of strict scrutiny to the race consciousness of UT’s admissions policy, although I believe
there is a strong argument to be made that the minimal consideration of race employed by the institution
does not warrant treatment as a racial classification warranting the application of strict scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265; West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry, supra note 85, at 1153–54 (describing Powell’s
observation that race consciousness for the purpose of ameliorating the effects of racially unfair
admissions criterion need not be treated as racial classifications subject to strict scrutiny).
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Fisher’s claim, Kennedy observed near the end of the Fisher II opinion that “it
remains an enduring challenge to our Nation’s education system to reconcile the
pursuit of diversity with the constitutional promise of equal treatment and
dignity.”133 With this statement, Kennedy frames race-conscious efforts to increase
racial diversity as a threat to white equal treatment and dignity,134 even though he is
acutely aware that UT’s race consciousness had no demonstrable negative impact
on white applicants. Thus, in an opinion upholding a racial affirmative action policy,
Kennedy reveals that he continues to make rejected white plaintiffs, even those with
less than stellar credentials like Abigail Fisher, the central benefactors of the
“constitutional promise” of the Equal Protection Clause.135
No evidence was presented in the Fisher litigation that demonstrated that UT’s
minimal race consciousness136 decreased white or Asian American rates of selection
or, for that matter, increased African American and Latino rates of selection.137
Although Justice Kennedy observed that race was a “meaningful factor that can
make a difference in the evaluation of a student’s application,”138 he only supported
this statement with UT student enrollment data, not the selection rate data that is
set forth in Part I of this Article.139 Kennedy failed to recognize the empirical reality
that UT’s holistic review had three attributes that warranted the judicial deference
that accompanies the more defendant-friendly rational basis and intermediate
scrutiny standards of review. First, UT’s holistic review was only very minimally race
conscious; second, UT’s holistic review was facially heavily reliant on SAT scores,
and; third, the overwhelming majority of holistic review admission slots went to
whites and did so at twice the selection rate for African Americans and Latinos.140
Fisher II’s treatment of UT’s holistic review as a racial classification and its
default application of strict scrutiny analysis exemplify the reversed equal protection
doctrine I critique here. The Court applies its most rigorous protection to Abigail
Fisher’s claim even though there is good reason to suspect UT’s lower admission

133. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. The Court was correct to note that “it is not a failure of narrow tailoring for the impact
of racial consideration to be minor.” Id. at 15.
137. In its Fisher II Supreme Court brief, UT responded to Fisher’s claim that its race conscious
admissions process had minimal impact on its admission of African American and Latino applicants by
pointing to increases in enrollment, not admission rates. Brief for Respondents at 8, Fisher II, No. 14CV-981 [hereinafter Fisher II Brief for Respondents] (“[B]y 2007, the number of enrolled AfricanAmerican students admitted through holistic review had nearly doubled from 2004, climbing from 3.6%
of the holistic class in 2004 to 6.8% in 2007. SJA 157a. Enrollment of Hispanic students likewise
increased.”). Similarly, UTs observation that “20% of all African-Americans students offered admission
to the 2008 class, and 15% of all Hispanic students, were admitted through holistic review,” id. at 11,
ignores my analysis in Figure 4 which shows the percentage of white students admitted through holistic
review was significantly higher—32.5%. See supra Figure 4.
138. Brief for Respondents, supra note 29, at 10 (citing Petitioner Appendix at 281a and 180a).
139. See supra Part I. The Court’s discussion of this point mirrored UT’s reliance on Petitioner’s
description of UT’s policy and enrollment, not admissions data. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212.
140. See supra Figure 1.
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rates for African American and Latino students are the result of inappropriate overreliance on SAT scores in UT’s holistic review. Kennedy’s vote to uphold UT’s
holistic review is far from a harbinger of a more affirmative-action-friendly
Kennedy jurisprudence. As striking as Kennedy’s vote against Abigail Fisher was as
a deviation from his past votes in affirmative action cases,141 the Fisher II case does
not reveal any cognizable shift in the Court’s or Kennedy’s hyper-empathy for
reverse discrimination claimants. Instead, Kennedy’s treatment of UT holistic
review as a racial classification warranting strict scrutiny reflects the Court’s
reversed equal protection doctrine.
For Kennedy, the mere fact that UT’s policy was even minimally race
conscious was sufficient to treat the policy as a doctrinal threat to whites—a racial
classification warranting strict scrutiny review.142 Based on little more than the fact
that the doctrine is now “well established,”143 Kennedy has remained committed to
treating any and all race consciousness challenged by a reverse discrimination
plaintiff as a racial classification. He has expressed the view that “there is simply no
way of determining” whether “race-based measures” are motivated by a desire to
be racially inclusive or “motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or
simple racial politics.”144 However, Kennedy has never confronted the theoretical
incoherence of holding the view that the Supreme Court lacks the capacity to
determine whether a policy is motivated by inclusive purpose or invidious
purpose if the policy is facially race-conscious yet viewing the Court as possessing
that very capacity if the policy in question is facially race-neutral.145 The empirical
analysis in Part I of this Article offers a concrete method by which the Court can
141. For Kennedy, the combination of Fisher’s lower SAT score and UT Austin’s heavy reliance
on such scores demonstrates that Fisher did not have the “high, and justified, expectation[ ],” Ricci, 557
U.S. at 593, of admission that she would need in order to persuade Justice Kennedy that race
predominated the decision not to admit her. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2433; Ricci, 557 U.S. at 627; see also
Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts
Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653, 654 (2015) (“[T]he [Roberts] Court has demonstrated that government
may change the selection standards in competitive processes without triggering strict scrutiny if the
government acts (1) with a race-conscious goal of promoting equal opportunity; (2) the government
requires a selection standard that is appropriate for the context; and (3) the standard does not classify
individuals by race.”); Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court 2012 Term Foreword: Equality Divided, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1, 45 (2013) (arguing that “[t]he justifications for strict scrutiny in affirmative action
cases no longer emphasize the importance of protecting innocent victims of affirmative action,” but
rather focus on constraining uses of race in order to “protect[ ] expectations of fair dealing that citizens
have in interacting with the government”).
142. In Fisher I, he admonished the Court of Appeals for not being strict enough in its
application of strict scrutiny. See 133 S. Ct. at 2433.
143. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (noting that it is well established that when a governmental policy is
subjected to strict scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving that racial classifications are
“narrowly tailored” measures that further compelling governmental interests) (citing Johnson
v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505 (2005)).
144. Id.
145. C.f., Ian Haney-Lopez, Intentional Blindness, N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1784 (2012)
(“Colorblindness denies that the state’s purposes can be discerned; intent doctrine demands proof of
malicious purpose”).
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indeed distinguish between race-conscious admissions practices that warrant
doctrinal treatment as a racial classification and race-conscious policies, like UTs
holistic review, so meek they still manage to advantage whites and thus should not
trigger strict scrutiny.
While there could, in theory, come a time when it would be difficult for the
Court to determine whether a university added a race-conscious component to its
admissions policy to disproportionally exclude whites based on a theory of white
inferiority because it viewed whites as racially inferior, this was obviously not the
scenario in Fisher II.146 The race consciousness employed by selective American
universities today is, at best, diversity-motivated and, at worst, motivated by a desire
to maximize SAT scores without replacing standardized test scores with equally
effective but less racially skewed admission criteria.147
Applying equal protection analysis in a reversed manner—favoring claims by
whites, a racial group that has not been the victim of historical race discrimination
in America, over the claims of nonwhites—results in a doctrinal empathy for
reverse race discrimination claims and a doctrinal apathy for traditional race
discrimination claims.148 The Court should find this double standard untenable. The
facts in Fisher II—a race-conscious policy touted as racial affirmative action that
confers a white admissions advantage being challenged by a white applicant rejected
for non-racial reasons—is a scenario likely to be presented to the Court in a future
legal challenge. In fact, Kennedy’s decision to treat UT’s holistic review as a racial
classification without discussion will likely embolden more rejected white and Asian
American applicants to sue universities over facially race-conscious admissions
policies even when the race consciousness had no negative impact on their
admission.149
The Court should adopt a doctrinal rule that discourages a parade of future
equal protection claims like Fisher’s. Under this new rule, reverse discrimination
claimants like Fisher whose lawsuits are based solely on claim to a race-blindness
entitlement,150 not a merit-driven claim, would be required to present evidence that
the race-conscious policy they seek to challenge had a cognizable exclusionary effect
146. UT did not add race consciousness to its holistic review because the institution harbored
the view that whites are racially inferior, nor does its minimal race consciousness disproportionately
exclude white applicants at any stage. The reality is that UT is not many decades removed from an
explicit legal regime that endorsed a Jim Crow racial hierarchy with whites at the top as racially superior
to nonwhites. The racial composition of UT’s undergraduate campus was all-white under Jim Crow
laws and whites have been the most well-represented racial group at UT since then. See, e.g., Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950).
147. Cf. West-Faulcon Fisher I Amicus Brief, supra note 14 at 27–29 (explaining theoretical
deficiencies in traditional g-based standardized test and greater predictive power and smaller racial skew
of tests based on more accurate, modern theories of intelligence).
148. See, e.g., Davis, 426 U.S. at 242–46 (discussing Palmer v. Thompson and the requirement
that plaintiffs prove discriminatory effect of policy challenged under the Equal Protection Clause).
149. See, e.g., Complaint, Students for Fair Admissions Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., No. 1:14-CV00954, 2017 WL 213940 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 2017); Complaint, Students for Fair Admissions,
Inc. v. President of Harvard Coll., No. 14.-CV-14176, 2015 WL 3683230 (D. Mass. June 15, 2015).
150. See generally West-Faulcon, Forsaking Claims of Merit, supra note 6.
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on whites.151 The current untenable doctrinal double standard could be resolved by
requiring reverse discrimination claimants to demonstrate race has had some
empirically verifiable impact on the outcomes of the admissions policy at issue in
order to constitute a racial classification triggering strict scrutiny. Doctrinally,
reverse discrimination claimants should be required to prove racially discriminatory
impact.152 Otherwise, the Court will no doubt be faced with deciding more reverse
discrimination claims “gone wild.”153
CONCLUSION
The equal protection doctrine the Court has developed in affirmative action
cases over the past four decades has lost its logical connection to its articulated goal
of protecting non-beneficiary races from the harms of racial affirmative action.
Kennedy’s unquestioned application of strict scrutiny to rejected white applicant
Abigail Fisher’s equal protection challenge of an admissions policy that selected
whites at twice the rate it selected African Americans and Latinos indicates the
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is no longer tethered to correcting racialized
harm. While the outcome in Fisher II was cause for celebration by proponents of
racial affirmative action, the doctrinal rule—strict scrutiny—applied by the Court
shows Justice Kennedy remains tied to a reversed theory of equal protection that is
intensely sensitive to concerns of reverse discrimination and remains unwelcoming
to the application of equal protection limits to facially race-neutral policies that
unjustifiably exclude African Americans and Latinos.
Contrary to Abigail Fisher’s claim that UT’s holistic review process constituted
reverse discrimination against her, this Article has presented admissions rate analysis
that shows that white students evaluated under UT’s race-conscious holistic review
were admitted at a higher rate than all other racial groups—22.3%. This was more
than double the admission rate for Latino and African American applicants and the
racial disparity in selection was so large that it likely constitutes prima facie evidence
of Title VI disparate impact discrimination against African Americans and Latinos,
particularly when considered in light of the heavy weight UT’s holistic review gave
to SAT scores.
Giving such a high degree of reverse discrimination judicial scrutiny to an
admissions policy that selected white students twice as often as African American
151. Cf. Robinson, supra note 10, at 184 (considering “how radically different the law would
be” if Abigail Fisher “had to establish not that Texas applied a racial classification, but that Texas
harbored animus toward white people”).
152. The Court has never required reverse discrimination plaintiffs to demonstrate racially
discriminatory effect against members of their racial group. See, e.g., Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198; Fisher I,
133 S. Ct. 2411; Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469; Bakke, 438
U.S. 265. My point here is that a lesson to be taken from the Fisher litigation is that the Court should
start doing so. Justice Kennedy discussed the lack of evidence that UT’s race conscious had a negative
impact on Fisher’s rejection but never suggested that fact should have a doctrinal consequence.
153. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2232 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing UT’s holistic review
admissions policy as affirmative action “gone wild”).
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and Latino students puts the Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
at war with the original purpose of the clause—protecting the victims of racial
subjugation. This makes Fisher II emblematic of the perverse results of the reversing
of equal protection. Although it ultimately upholds UT’s holistic review as
constitutional, Kennedy’s application of strict scrutiny in Fisher II exalts the reverse
discrimination claims of whites and makes no mention of how poorly African
Americans and Latinos fared under holistic review compared to whites and Asian
Americans. Requiring reverse discrimination plaintiffs to demonstrate a policy’s
cognizable group-based racialized impact in order to trigger strict scrutiny would be
an important first step in righting the Court’s enduring equal protection reversal.
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